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Masculine Generics and Gender-aware Alternatives in Spanish1 
Feminist linguistics have established that the use of masculine generics (MG), i.e.  linguistic 
forms that are used sex-specifically in reference to men and generically in reference to 
mixed groups, leads perceivers to over-represent the men in their mental representation of 
people. We review empirical research on MG and summarize an experiment we conducted 
on effects of MG in Spanish. In that experiment, 195 participants read short stories in 
which groups of people were referred to with either MG or one of two gender-aware 
alternative forms. Then participants gave names to the stories‘ protagonists, which we used 
as indicators of their mental gender representation. Analyses showed that MG evoked a 
male bias in this task, and that the alternative forms alleviated this bias. More implicit 
gender associations, which we additionally assessed with a word-fragment completion 
task, showed no clear effect of language form. Ambivalent sexism and attitudes toward 
gender-aware language did not affect any of the dependent variables. In discussing the 
results, we present recommendations for gender-fair language use and develop ideas for 
further research.
Masculine Generics and Gender-aware Alternatives in Spanish
Gender inequality is a phenomenon that can be observed in societies throughout the 
world. The Global Gender Gap Index 2013 of the World Economic Forum (Hausmann, 
Tyson, Bekhouche, & Zahidi, 2013) quantifies the magnitude of gender-based disparities 
in political, economical, educational, and health-related criteria, and none of the 136 
countries examined reached gender equality. According to the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), being a woman is a main health risk factor worldwide (García-Moreno, Jansen, 
Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2005). How these disparities are caused and how they can be 
tackled are complex questions that touch upon many different aspects of human history, 
culture, politics, and more. One causal factor may be the constitutive role of language. 
Feminist writers have conceptualized language as a principal element for the stabilization 
of social conditions as well as an active means for emancipatory transformation and change 
(for a review and discussion, see Butler, 1990, especially chapter 1.VI).  Concerning 
gender, this means that, on the one hand, language may represent, reproduce, and 
reinforce the status quo of gender relations in society, but, on the other hand, may also be 
used as an instrument of conscientization and change.
Representation of Gender in Language
In order to talk about the representation of gender in languages, we first need to clarify 
some terms. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “gender” refers to the cultural 
and social traits typically associated with one sex, whereas the term “sex” refers to biological 
aspects. We consider both sex and gender to be social constructs and neither determined 
nor determining categories (for a detailed argumentation, see Voß, 2010). In this text, 
we only employ the term “gender”, because we are interested in social roles and not in 
biological parts. For the same reason, when talking about “women” and “men” as well as 
“female” and “male,” we also refer to gender, not to sex. 
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 In all language systems, the genders are represented somehow. According to 
Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen, and Sczesny (2007), the variation of structural differences 
between languages concerning their representation of the genders can be distinguished 
into three main language types: Grammatical gender languages, natural gender languages 
and genderless languages. In the grammatical gender languages (GGL), such as German, 
Spanish, Russian, Hebrew, and others, gender is coded as a grammatical category: Every 
noun is either feminine or masculine (or neuter in some languages), and nearly all personal 
nouns, adjectives, and pronouns carry gender markers, so that reference to gender is very 
frequent. (An example in Spanish: “Una trabajadora francesa fue la mas simpatica del 
grupo de voluntarios.”) In natural gender languages (NGL) like English or Scandinavian 
languages there is no grammatical marking of gender in nouns, and most personal nouns 
refer to both genders (e.g., English: “student”, “neighbour”, “doctor”), whereas personal 
pronouns reflect the gender of human beings (e.g., English: “Every student wants to give 
his/her best.”). There are also languages without grammatical gender at all, neither in the 
noun system nor in personal pronouns. Gender is only expressed by lexical means (e.g., 
in words like Turkish “erkek” = “man, male” or “kız” = “girl”). These languages are called 
genderless languages (GL) and include Turkish, Finnish, Iranian, Chinese, Swahili, and 
others. In spite of these structural differences, it is not the language type that makes a 
language more or less sexist or egalitarian. As Stahlberg et al. (2007) point out: “However, 
expressing or concealing sex in language is not in itself sexist or non-sexist. The decisive 
question is whether references to sex are symmetrical (…)” (p. 167, emphasis ours), which 
means that the genders are treated linguistically equally. In fact, asymmetries regarding 
gender references are found in all three language types.
 An example for these asymmetries is the markedness of female/feminine forms. 
As we see, for example, in the German words for male teachers “Lehrer” and female 
teachers “Lehrerinnen”, the female form has an additional suffix to the male form, is 
longer and more complex. This kind of suffixes, which can be found in each language 
type, mark femaleness as a deviation from a male norm. There are many other forms of 
asymmetries in language structure. Probably the most systematic type of asymmetries are 
masculine generics (MG). In the words of Stahlberg et al. (2007), MG are “linguistic 
forms with a double function: They are used sex-specifically in reference to male persons 
and generically in reference to mixed groups and to people whose sex is unknown or 
irrelevant” (p. 169). Examples from the three language types would be, for Spanish 
(GGL): “los estudiantes”  = the students, referring to groups of men as well as to mixed 
groups; for English (NGL): “Everyone should take responsibility for his life”; and for 
Turkish (GL): “adam” means both “man” and “human being”). Forms of MG can also be 
found in each language type, but GGLs have the highest frequency of MG as they have 
the most gender-referring forms. The use, impact, and reform of MG have always been a 
main issue of feminist language critique and its opponents.
Debate on Feminist Language Critique
Already in 1895, Elizabeth Cady Stanton criticized the use of masculine generic pronouns 
as a symbol of oppression of women and recommended using the neutral pronoun “they” 
to prevent misunderstandings. Since then, linguists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
political activists have joined the debate with many different opinions and explications. 
Altogether, two main argumentation lines can be identified. Feminist language critique 
claims that the use of MG makes women and women‘s rights, interests, and achievements 
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invisible, and supports a fundamentally androcentrist view of the world, in which the 
male is depicted as the norm and the female as deviant. Representatives of this point 
of view are Luise Pusch (1980) and Senta Trömel-Plötz (1982) regarding the German 
language, and Robin Lakoff (1973) regarding US English. The opponent position argues 
that MG forms are unrelated to gender and purely grammatical. Existing disparities are 
regarded as caused by social conditions and impervious to being influenced or changed by 
language. This position is described in Martyna (1980) and Blaubergs (1980) for English, 
and in Burkhardt (1985) for German. A brief but enlightening outline of the positions 
and their representatives is given in Stahlberg et al. (2007). 
 There is less literature on this topic for Spanish, but the opponent positions are 
basically the same. Jiménez, Román, and Traverso (2011) see language as representing and 
constructing social realities and as an important element on the way to gender equality, 
whereas the Real Academia Española (RAE) – the highest authority in language questions 
in the Spanish-speaking world – states that MG are purely arbitrary and grammatical, 
and that innovative forms are unnecessary and even ridiculous (RAE, 2006). We took this 
situation as the starting point for studying empirically the effects of MG and alternative 
language forms in Spanish. Before describing our own research, we briefly review existing 
research on other languages.
Empirical Research on Masculine Generics
Along with the theoretical debate on MG and sexist language there has also been 
some empirical research, mostly supporting the MG-critical position. In most of the 
experiments on the effects of MG, generic sentences or texts were presented in several 
versions: one version using MG and one or more versions using alternative language 
forms (e.g., masculine/feminine slash forms or innovative forms like the feminine form 
with uppercase “I” in German plural nouns). Then, different methods were used to 
capture participants‘ mental representations of gender concerning the persons the texts 
referred to. Heise (2000), for example, asked German-speaking participants to write a 
short story based on the sentences presented before, and to give names to the protagonists, 
under the pretext of conducting a study on creativity. Results showed that the MG 
personal nouns (e.g., “Vegetarier”) evoked significantly more male names than female 
ones, whereas a male/female splitting form (e.g., “Vegetarier/innen”) led participants to 
produce a balanced number of male and female names. There was also a condition with 
gender-neutral nouns (e.g., “Kinder”), which evoked a male bias comparable to the MG 
form. The uppercase “I” (e.g., “VegetarierInnen”) evoked a female bias in the names that 
participants produced. 
 In other studies, participants were asked to draw or select pictures of the 
protagonists in the texts (Sniezek & Jazwinski, 1986), complete sentences (Scheele & 
Gauler, 1993), or guess the ratio of women in a group (Braun, Gottburgsen, Sczesny, & 
Stahlberg, 1998). More recently, researchers have also used more implicit measures like 
reaction times for answering questions, reading texts or other types of processing. For 
example, Irmen and Roßberg (2004) presented sentences in MG form and measured 
reading times for the following sentence, in which the gender of the persons referred 
to either did or did not match the grammatical gender of the preceding sentence. An 
implicit influence was found with reading times being higher when the protagonists of a 
text did not match the grammatical gender than when they did.
 Findings were quite consistent in showing that MG evoke a male bias in the 
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cognitive representation of the genders, and that this bias may be weakened by the use 
of gender-aware linguistic forms. In some studies, neutralizing forms (like the pronoun 
“they”, “individual”, etc.) showed similar effects to MG (e.g., Heise, 2000), in others 
they weakened the male bias in a similar way as did other gender-aware forms (e.g., 
Stahlberg & Sczesny, 2001, Experiment 1; Gastil, 1990). It has been argued that the effect 
of neutral forms may be especially context-sensitive (Stahlberg et al., 2007). In many 
studies, a main effect of participant‘s gender could be found, in that women generally 
formed more female associations than men did (Hamilton, 1988; Stahlberg et al., 2001; 
among others).
 Most of the empirical research on the influence of MG language versus gender-
aware alternative forms examined English or German-speaking samples. There are very 
few studies on French (Gygax & Gabriel, 2008; Gygax et al., 2012), some that include 
data on Dutch (Backer, De Maarten, Cuypere, & Ludovic, 2012), on Norwegian 
(Gabriel & Gygax, 2008), and some comparing several languages (Gygax, Gabriel, 
Sarrasin, Oakhill, & Garnham, 2008; Gygax, Gabriel, Sarrasin, & Oakhill, 2009), most 
of them supporting the findings of studies on German and English. However, checking 
international publication databases we could not find any empirical study on the effects 
of gender-aware versus -unaware language forms in Spanish.
 It was plausible to expect that the general pattern of findings obtained with 
other GGL would also apply to Spanish. Like the uppercase “I”, which is specific to 
German, the Spanish language also has specific forms to avoid MG. One innovative and 
rather unconventional form is the @-form (e.g. “l@s estudiantes”). The @ is supposed 
to visually combine the letters o (indicating masculinity) and a (indicating feminity). 
However, it is probably more easily read as an “a”, so this form may be similar to the 
German uppercase “I” in that it emphasizes the feminine. A disadvantage of the @-form 
is that it is not applicable in some grammatical cases. For example, the MG form of “the 
Spanish” is “los españoles”, the feminine form is “las españolas”, so it would not be logical 
to use “l@s español@s” in this case. Apart from that, this form is not applicable in spoken 
language, because there is no practical way to pronounce the “@”.
 Another innovative form, which is less used and known, is the X-form (e.g. “lxs 
estudiantes”, “lxs españolxs”). This form is not pronounceable either, but consistently 
applicable in written language. The X-form is mostly found in left-wing feminist political 
contexts, representing a more radical form than the slash form, and also symbolizes a 
rejection of the normative binary sex and gender system of society (for more theoretical 
background to this critique, see Butler, 1990). The recommended form in formal 
guidelines on gender-fair language (Bernal Castro, 2007) is the slash form (e.g. “los/las 
estudiantes”).
Our Research on Gender(-un)-aware Language in Spanish
In a recent experiment with a Chilean sample, we compared effects of the X-form and the 
slash form both to each other and to those of the conventional MG form, using Heise‘s 
short-story-paradigm. 195 Chilean university students (83 women, 112 men) with a 
mean age of 20 years read the beginnings of two short stories about a group of people that 
were written either in MG form, slash form or X-form (e.g. “El grupo de tres amigxs se 
encuentra en su bar favorito.” = “The group of three friends meets in their favourite bar.”). 
They were asked to write a continuation of two to three sentences for each story and to 
give names to the protagonists. These chosen names‘ gender distribution was used as a 
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measure of participants‘ gender associations concerning the protagonists. 
 We expected that the MG form would evoke a male bias in the names‘ gender 
distribution by evoking more than 50% male names. We further expected that the 
alternative language forms would evoke fewer male names than would the MG form. In 
reference to the findings of Heise (2000), the slash form was expected to evoke roughly 
50% male and 50% female names.
Mental Representation of Gender – Main Findings 
Our results showed that MG language does evoke a male bias in gender representation, 
and that the alternative language forms slash and X both do alleviate this bias. An even 
stronger influence on the gender representation was evoked by participant‘s own gender, 
in the way that men generally had a stronger male bias than women. Hamilton (1988) 
suggested that this could be an effect of a projection of self into the stimulus sentences. 
However, Silveira (1980) had proposed the hypothesis of a “people = male bias” for both 
men and women. It claimed that a man is more likely perceived as a person than is a 
woman, and a person is more likely believed to be a man than a woman. Hamilton 
(1991) provided clear evidence for this hypothesis with several experiments. He showed, 
for example, that participants would be more likely to use gender non-specific terms like 
“person” or “individual” when referring back to a man than when referring back to a 
woman. Silveira (1980) argued that men‘s greater bias derives from having learnt as a boy 
that “the words which refer to himself and which exclude his opposites also refer to people 
in general”, so generic “he” would rather be male than female, whereas girls learn that 
“words that refer to [their] opposites, [their] not-selves, also refer to people in general” (p. 
175). She assumes that girls, in order to compensate for this dissonance, develop strategies 
to suppress male imagery from MG, whereas boys do not.
 Regarding the effects of alternative language forms, our results show that the 
slash form was closest to 50% male and female names, at least among women. In the 
male subsample, the slash form also raised the number of female names that participants 
produced, but did not evoke a 50% equality. Apparently, the gender effect described 
above is stronger than the effect of the slash form in the male subsample.
 Interestingly, the X-form had no significant effect on men, but evoked 50% 
female names in the female subsample, almost like the slash form. This is not just explicable 
by the gender effect. From a purely formal perspective, “X” is a neutral letter, neither in 
its shape nor in its sound does it resemble the masculine-marking “O” or of the feminine-
marking “A” (unlike, for example, the “@”, which reminds readers of the feminine word 
form in shape and sound, and might evoke a female bias).  Silveira (1980) argues that 
women, having developed strategies to suppress male imagery from MG, tend to have less 
people=male bias and less people=self bias than men, so that could be a reason why they 
interpret the X-form truly generically, whereas male participants, having a stronger people 
= male bias and people=self bias, tend toward male imagery. The slash form, however, 
succeeds in weakening this bias even for male readers because it makes the feminine form 
explicit. Another consideration is that the X has a slightly aggressive character because it 
questions gender quite offensively. Wherever gender concepts are critically questioned, 
the male privileges in a patriarchal system are threatened. The X-form could therefore 
provoke reactance in male readers, leading them to reject this language form, and to 
react by (consciously or unconsciously) choosing fewer female names than in the slash 
condition.
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Implicit Aspects of Gender Representation
In most of the research on the effects of language form done so far, rather explicit 
measures were used to capture participants‘ cognitive representations: Writing stories, 
answering questions, drawing pictures, etc. are conscious processes, and it is possible that 
participants answer in a socially or politically reflected way. It would thus be of interest to 
use more implicit measures in order to find out about the effects of language forms on a 
less conscious level. In a different context, Bohner et al. (1998) had used ambiguous word 
fragments that could be completed either in a gender-related or in a neutral fashion, to 
detect the cognitive accessibility of the gender concept.
 According to feminist language critique, MG represent a socially dominating 
male norm. Alternative language forms break with this norm and point out the dissonance 
between the usual MG word form and the actual gender of the persons referred to. It is 
probable that this draws attention to gender ratio and gender in general. If that is the 
case, we may assume that alternative language forms increase the cognitive accessibility 
of the gender concept compared to the MG form. More specifically, these forms may 
increase the relative accessibility of the concept of femininity (vs. masculinity). Based 
on these considerations, we also employed an implicit measure of construct accessibility 
by using ambiguous word fragments in the above-mentioned experiment in Chile. After 
having read sentences in MG form, slash form or X-form, respectively, participants were 
asked to complete, as quickly as possible, word fragments that had more than one possible 
solution. For example, the fragment “H__J__” could be completed as HIJO (son), HIJA 
(daughter), or HOJA (leaf ). The completions made by participants were later classified 
as “masculine”, “feminine”, or “neutral” completions. A higher number of “feminine” or 
“masculine” completions was supposed to indicate a higher instantaneous accessibility of 
the concept of gender.
 Unfortunately, our analyses showed that the word fragment measure did not fulfil 
conventional standards of reliability. Although we did find a small effect of participant‘s 
gender, with female participants producing more feminine word completions than male 
participants, there was no clear effect of language form. 
 Despite this, we are confident that the method of word completions could work 
as an implicit measure in future research. In the case of this first study, the method may just 
not have been sensitive enough. This may be because we used a relatively small number of 
stimuli and did not control for the frequency of use of the possible solutions. Although 
it is difficult to construct word fragments with gender-specific and neutral solutions that 
are equally frequent, this aspect should be explicitly addressed in the construction of 
future implicit measures. Furthermore, in future analyses the word completions should 
be weighted according to their word frequency. 
 Another idea is to use fragments of names that can be completed both to a male 
and to a female name, instead of (or in addition to) abstract terms or objects. Thus, the 
possible completions would probably be more equally frequent, and they might reflect 
more closely the cognitive representations of people. With this method it would not 
be possible to capture a general concept of gender, but more specific representations of 
femininity and masculinity. In any case, we believe that further research on the impact 
of language form on an implicit level would be of great interest, and other implicit 
measures, such as ambivalent pictures or eye-tracking experiments, could be useful. For 
an overview on implicit measures, their underlying theoretical rationales and advice on 
implementation in research, see Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007).
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The Influence of Sexist Attitudes
Finally, one could assume that participants‘ level of sexism as well as their attitudes toward 
MG and alternative language forms could affect the results. There are different measures 
of sexism. An internationally validated measure based on a theoretically profound concept 
is the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory by Glick and Fiske (1996). Having recognized that 
a uni-dimensional approach to sexism cannot capture its subtle and complex different 
aspects, they constructed a measure with two positively correlated subscales: hostile 
sexism (HS), representing an antipathy against women (and especially those women who 
do not conform to traditional roles), and benevolent sexism (BS), capturing more subtle, 
and seemingly positive, stereotypical attitudes toward women, which are nonetheless 
sexist because they restrict women to certain roles and images, and contribute to keeping 
women subordinated. Both aspects of sexism go together and the two subscales HS 
and BS form a general measure of ambivalent sexism (AS). Attitudes toward gender-
aware language (AL) are a less commonly used measure, quantifying a person‘s liking for 
innovative language forms regarding gender-relations and their consciousness for gender 
inequalities in language.
 In the Chilean experiment, both AS and AL were reliably assessed, but none of 
them was associated with the representation of female and male protagonists, nor did it 
moderate the effects of gender(-un)-aware language on those representations. It therefore 
seems that the effect of language form may be quite independent of people‘s personal 
attitudes. This could be interpreted as being in line with the position of feminist language 
critique that the male bias evoked by MG emerges because MG are often interpreted in 
a sex-specific way, in spite of people knowing that they are generic (for further evidence, 
see Gygax et al., 2009).
Conclusion
Our recent experiment on Chilean Spanish replicates previous findings that MG language 
evokes a male bias in gender representation, and that alternative language forms weaken this 
bias. A strong gender effect was found, too. On the implicit measure, participant‘s gender 
evoked a small effect, whereas language form did not. However, the operationalization 
of this measure was not sufficiently reliable to draw firm conclusions yet. Sexism and 
language-related attitudes, despite being measured reliably, did neither directly affect our 
gender representation measures, nor did they moderate any of the observed effects.
 Based on these results and the preceding studies on other languages, we would 
strongly recommend the conscious and consistent use of gender-aware language in every 
possible context. In Spanish, the slash form seems to be the form that comes closest to 
an equal representation of the genders, so it is the recommendable form in most cases. 
The X-form had evoked similar effects, but only in the female subsample. According to 
Silveira’s (1980) argumentation (see above, “Mental Representation of Gender - Main 
Findings”), women interpret the X-form truly generically, because they have less of a 
people=male bias and less of a people=self bias than men do. It would be interesting to 
find out if people who are generally more aware of the issue of gender representation in 
language and reflect their own position in the gender-system more consciously would 
show smaller people=male and people=self biases than average. If so, the X-form might be 
more appropriate in those contexts.
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Concerning further research questions, we would like to point out that there is very little 
research on effects of MG other than on cognitive representations. Two experiments by 
Vervecken and Hannover (2012) showed that speakers who used gender-balanced forms 
in German were perceived to be more competent and less sexist by others. A couple of 
studies have examined the impact of language form in the labor context, such as Bem and 
Bem (1973) and Stericker (1981), who showed that women reacted less to job adverts 
presented in MG than in alternative language forms. Hamilton, Hunter, and Stuart-
Smith (1992) examined the legal context and found that participants acknowledged less 
often that a fictive woman accused of murder could claim self-defense, after they had 
read a definition of self-defense in MG language than in alternative language forms. We 
are convinced that gender (un-)-aware language has an impact on many more aspects of 
everyday life. For example, there is no research to date on how language form may affect 
speakers‘ or listeners‘ affect. We think that it would be especially interesting to examine 
if MG has an effect on self-related attitudes and feelings like self-esteem or striving for 
autonomy. It is possible that effects on this more affective level only appear after a longer 
time of confrontation with alternative language forms, which could only be observed by 
longitudinal designs.
 Obviously, the conclusion from the present study, in the context of previous 
research, is that language matters. However, it is also obvious that language forms and 
rules alone will not change a system of male dominance that has a history of thousands 
of years. If there is no woman in a ministry, a supreme court, or a management board, 
speaking of “los/las ministros/as” (the ministers), “los/las jueces” (the judges), or “los/
las gerentes” (the managers) will not miraculously make one appear there. But it will call 
attention onto this disparity, it can denounce inequalities and inspire people to dare the 
change. And for this purpose it is absolutely justifiable and even useful that gender-aware 
language may be unfamiliar to our ears and eyes, sometimes complicated and annoying, 
or provoking controversies. As long as we face inequalities, discrimination and oppression, 
we need to stand up against them, we need to reflect our own privileges and practices, we 
need controversies. And we need language to talk about it.
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